Neoliberal rhetoric rears its ugly head in the current issue of The New York Review of Books, as its neoconservative cousin gives birth to their love child in the haemorrhaging Middle East. The stillborn foreign policy delivered by John Kerry during his presidential campaign, “progressive internationalism” (.pdf), a manual conceived by liberal hawks that was critiqued so well by Anatol Lieven two years ago, is even less viable as an “alternative” or “radical challenge” to current policies today, than it was in 2004. And Social Democrats, more twinkle in daddy’s eye than strong in numbers, are still displaying tunnel vision they seem determined to pass on to the next generation.
The liberal hawks are partly right: Ideas are critical both to stemming the tide of Islamist revolution and its terrorist offshoots and to maintaining the unity of the West. But the approach they advocate all but insures American defeat, for reasons that should be all too apparent from the unfolding debacle in Iraq. These reasons are fourfold, and closely interconnected: (1) The approach lumps together all Muslim forces critical of the United States and Israel into one hostile and ideologically united camp; (2) it ignores the critically important role of local ethnic feeling not only in hostility to the United States but in the historical processes of democratization and modernization across much of the world; (3) it turns a blind eye to Israeli crimes; and (4) it treats America’s allies as useful but contemptible idiots whose views and interests need not be seriously considered.
Progressive internationalism informs, “Mindless in Iraq“, Peter Galbraith’s review of, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq by Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco by David L. Phillips, The Foreigner’s Gift: The Americans, the Arabs, and the Iraqis in Iraq by Fouad Ajami, and Ahmad’s War, Ahmad’s Peace: Surviving Under Saddam, Dying in the New Iraq by Michael Goldfarb.
Galbraith’s criticisms of the Iraq war defined Kerry’s campaign; too few troops deployed; no post-invasion plan; Rumsfeld’s an incompetent tyrant who purges anyone who dares to disagree with him. I assume that Galbraith is referencing the pro-war interpretation of Charles Duelfer’s Iraq Survey report when he claims that Saddam “maintained ambiguity about whether he had WMDs” as he did no such thing pre-invasion. Galbraith, seemingly brilliant and obviously well-connected, crawls out on yet another rotten limb where he perches Ahmad Chalabi as a fellow victim of the mentality “that is prepared to sacrifice intelligence sources and methods for partisan purposes,” as Iran could not have been sure its intelligence codes had been compromised before the Bush administration leaked the cable referring to Chalabi and “other sensitive information from the Iranian cable traffic” to NYT reporter James Risen. What I still find bizarre is that the Iranians would knowingly burn Chalabi if he was such a valuable source of intelligence. Allegedly, Chalabi attended the 2006 Bilderberg conference held in Canada, 8-11 June. If true, he’s weathering “exile” more like a king than a victim/traitor/thief.
“The Foreign Policy the US Needs“, Stanley Hoffmann’s review of America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy by Francis Fukuyama, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy by Stephen M. Walt, and Diplomacy Lessons: Realism for an Unloved Superpower by John Brady Kiesling, is the other major piece appearing in the current issue of the NYRB that is steeped in neoliberal rhetoric.
Hoffman appears to be a social democrat and raises tantalising ideas, such as reducing military expenditures by 50 percent, but he cages them in scurrilous ambiguities then pulls them down a well-worn path. He proposes complete withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, but only if troops are replaced by U.S.-funded peacekeepers, as in, the iron fist assumes the appearance of an international force, just as Kerry & Co. advocated. He freely admits that the UN is crippled by its dependency upon U.S. funding, with poor prospects of ever being reformed, but since NATO is just another extension of U.S. authority, how then would the deployment of such forces sustain his objective of “leaving behind no imperial residues”? He refers to Haiti and East Timor as if they imploded from neglect, not a push from U.S.-led coups, at least he does not mention them, and he speaks positively of Kiesling’s view that the problem is not the overthrowing of governments, democratically elected or otherwise, but U.S. failure to properly fund nation-building once U.S.-approved regimes are installed. When will the world be safe from America‘s helping hand? In Hoffman’s view, the work has not begun, and there is no end in sight. He cites Darfur as reason to reserve the right to forcibly remove genocidal regimes, “if authorized by the UN or, if the UN is paralyzed, by an association of genuine democracies,” in other words, he gives carte blanche to wolves in peacekeeping clothing. His radical new policy for the Middle East is a perfect example of the trap he wishes to set for democracies that are not genuine.
The US and its partners – the so-called Quartet – need to work hard for a two-state solution close to the one almost reached at Taba in early 2001. Then and now, a settlement would require that the Palestinians give up, in practice, the right of return to Israel, but it would provide them with a workable state that is not truncated or walled-in and has financial support. In arriving at such a settlement, Hamas – obviously divided between extremity and moderation – could be legitimately pressured to recognize Israel explicitly and to condemn terrorism unequivocally. In the immediate future, what is needed is a cease-fire based on a Palestinian declaration renouncing rocket attacks on Israel, and an Israeli declaration renouncing incursions and air strikes in Gaza. Moreover, the Palestinians would release the Israeli corporal held by their gunmen, Hezbollah would release the soldiers captured during its cross-border attack, and the Israelis would release the Palestinian officials they have seized.[See Gareth Evans and Robert Malley, “A Proposal to Curb the Escalating Tensions in Gaza,” Financial Times, July 6, 2006.] To achieve these outcomes, as war spreads in Lebanon, would require far more active American participation than has been the case so far. The destruction of Hamas by disproportionate Israeli reprisals would have the same effects as destruction of the Palestinian Authority by Sharon earlier: it would escalate violence, further radicalize the Palestinians and much of the Arab world, and encourage further attacks on American passivity or “complicitly.”
“Complicitly” (sic), in quotation marks? So, if the Palestinians under siege from a genocidal state simply surrender to the whims of their oppressor, would Hoffman finally recognise them as citizens of a “genuine” democracy who have a right to self-defense? He can’t even admit that the destruction of Lebanon is possible only because the U.S. allows it to happen.
If Hoffman truly believes this is a road map to peace, he is as delusional as the “humanitarian corridors” that Israel claims to be facilitating into Lebanon.
Pingback: karmalised