Professor Jonathan Cutler examines the rift between realists and neoconservatives and cautions the “Left” to not believe that “Right Arabists” such as Richard Clarke are antiwar. But this equation neglects to mention the third angle in D.C.’s foreign policy triangle that seems a better fit for Clarke. Leon Hadar in his so-far (I’m only a third of the way through it) compelling book, Sandstorm, refers to it as liberal internationalism. Mark Hand noted that “New” Democrats prefer to call it progressive internationalism and John Pilger tapped its deep roots in Bush or Kerry? No Difference:
It was the Wilsonian Democratic administration of Harry Truman, following the Second World War, that created the militaristic “national security state” and the architecture of the cold war: the CIA, the Pentagon and the National Security Council. As the only head of state to use atomic weapons, Truman authorized troops to intervene anywhere “to defend free enterprise.” In 1945, his administration set up the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as agents of US economic imperialism. Later, using the “moral” language of Woodrow Wilson, John F Kennedy invaded Vietnam and unleashed the US Special Forces as death squads; they now operate on every continent.
Bush has been a beneficiary of this. His neoconservatives derive not from traditional Republican Party roots, but from the hawk’s wings of the Democratic Party – such as the trade union establishment, the AFL-CIO (known as the “AFL-CIA”), which received millions of dollars to subvert unions and political parties throughout the world, and the weapons industry, built and nurtured by the Democratic senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson. Paul Wolfowitz, Bush’s leading fanatic, began his Washington political life working for Jackson. In 1972 an aberration, George McGovern, faced Richard Nixon as the Democrats’ antiwar candidate. Virtually abandoned by the party and its powerful backers, McGovern was crushed.
Cutler excerpts Geov Parrish’s 14 January 2006 interview of Noam Chomsky to assert that Chomsky’s commentaries to date concerning the decision to invade Iraq posit “not only Realpolitik, but a unified actor.” Cutler writes that Chomsky “seems not to have taken note of neo-conservatives or any factional battles within the Bush administration.” But Chomsky has done so and often makes the point that “they’re not conservatives at all. They’re radical nationalists. They’re radical nationalist extremists, who serve private power with fanatic dedication. They despise democracy, they want to eliminate it.” And in the interview, On Bush, the Left, Iraq, and Israel [ 4 February 2004 Left Hook ], Chomsky said this about them: “Within elite sectors, there is a great deal of concern over their brazen arrogance, remarkable incompetence, and willingness to increase serious threats to the country and to transfer a huge burden to coming generations for short-term gain. Their war in Iraq, for example, was strongly opposed by leading sectors of the foreign policy elite, and perhaps even more strikingly, the corporate world. But the same sectors will continue to support the Bush circles, strongly. It is using state power to lavish huge gifts on them, and they basically share the underlying premises even if they are concerned about the practice and the irrationality of the actors, and the dangers they pose.”
Cutler eventually concludes that “there are at least two imperialist camps in Washington — one Right Arabist and one Right Zionist. Both are “sensible,” within the framework of imperialist statecraft.” It seems the real rift that exists between him, Chomsky, and Gilbert Achcar, is whether the neocons actually believe the democracy rhetoric they espouse. Chomsky believes they don’t. Achcar believes they’re crackpot idealists. Cutler believes it fits into their plans for a Greater Israel.
I think all three are correct depending on the time of day.
Leon Hadar explains that neoconservatives intend to replace the off-shore balancing strategy favoured by realists and internationalists with a direct and unilateral American presence in the region.
By extension, the control of the oil resources in the Persian Gulf would not depend anymore on the goodwill of governments in the region, but would be determined exclusively by American military power. The neocons also replaced the policy based on the need to juggle American commitments to Israel and to its Arab partners with one based on total support for the Israeli position, with America continuing to work to resolve the Israel/Palestine conflict – but under the terms set by a nationalistic Israeli agenda. The result has been the political and ideological marriage between the American Empire and Greater Israel. Finally, the neoconservatives based their strategy on unilateral American military presence in the Middle East on the assumption that the European allies should not play any role in determining the future of the Middle East. In fact, Europe was seen as a global rival that should be expelled from the region. As the neoconservative narrative would describe it, an American-Israeli alliance in the Middle East would now be able to stand up to the global threat posed by a Euro-Arab axis in the region.
Cutler provides riveting examples of neoconservative reasoning for allowing Iraq’s Shia to assume the facade of power in Iraq. “In many respects, Right Zionist war plans for Iraq represents an audacious attempt to reverse the pro-Saudi tilt in US policy that developed in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution and deepened with the movement of US forces onto Saudi soil following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Make no mistake: the US invaded Iraq, but it went to war with the Saudis. The Iraqi political tilt toward Iran is not an accident — the unintended consequence of bumbling naiveté — so much as the heart of a future geo-strategic alliance with Iranian Shiites, if not the incumbent clerical regime.” Not only does it clarify why an “unauthorized back-channel between Iranian dissidents and advisers in Feith’s office” was in play, but it would explain why Israel was fingered for doing something that’s likely ordinarily condoned.
Chomsky told Parrish, “We’re not allowed to concede that our leaders have rational imperial interests. We have to assume that they’re good-hearted and bumbling. But they’re not. They’re perfectly sensible. They can understand what anybody else can understand. So the first step in talk about withdrawal is: consider the actual situation, not some dream situation, where Bush is pursuing a vision of democracy or something. If we can enter the real world we can begin to talk about it. And yes, I think there should be withdrawal, but we have to talk about it in the real world and know what the White House is thinking. They’re not willing to live in a dream world.”
I’m not convinced Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld weren’t played by the neocons. Regardless, in the “real world” there are three distinct forces vying for control; conservative realists, liberal internationalists, and neoconservatives hellbent on bringing the world to heel, immediately if not sooner. If that’s not the definition of a nightmare, ask the average Iraqi what is, then.
If you’re looking for an argument against their policies, read Leon Hadar’s book, Sandstorm.