Coup and counter-coup: The struggle for Iraq*
By Sami Moubayed
A coup is undemocratic of course, but it is one way to bring order to a war-torn country. Allawi would pledge to restore Iraq’s parliament, which is packed with pro-Iran politicians and clerics, but not before Iraqi society was pulled back together – with force and determination. “Security first, democracy second” would be his motto.
Allawi has naturally denied rumors of a coup. In an interview with the London-based Al-Hayat newspaper on Wednesday he said, “I never had faith in coups, which brought nothing but catastrophes to our people (in reference to the military coups that have rocked Iraq since the revolution of 1958).”
He dropped a confusing remark, however, saying that although he would not support a military putsch, he nevertheless did not believe that pure democracy was compatible with Iraqi politics. Allawi noted, “One cannot bring American democracy to a country that is occupied like Iraq, and whose infrastructure, as well as military and governmental institutions, have been destroyed.”
[…]
But two factors make this idea unlikely. One is that Allawi, no matter how strong he may be, is not an officer in the army. Few officers would risk their necks for a civilian – again, as Arab coup history has shown since 1949. As long as he is not a member of the Army, his chances of a successful coup are limited.
A second reason why his coup would be difficult is that although the Americans might allow or facilitate it, Iran would never be so obliging toward a coup against its allies in Baghdad.
Thus, if one pro-American coup took place by Allawi, a counter pro-Iranian coup would would take place a few months later, headed by someone like Abdul Aziz al-Hakim of the SCIRI.
The situation in Iraq could slide into one similar to the struggle over Syria in the 1950s, where every regional player was trying to pull the weak democracy into its camp. The Syrians badly wanted democracy, but were unable to maintain it because of the meddling of so many outside players, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Israel and the United States. The title of British journalist Patrick Seale’s classic book, The Struggle for Syria, summed up the situation well.
Today, this term applies equally to Iraq. It is truly a struggle for Iraq between Allawi, Jaafari, Muqtada, Hakim, Talabani, the Americans, the British and the Iranians.
Does Moubayed dismiss Saudi Arabia as a player or roll it into the category of American/British support for Allawi’s coup?
What other reason could there be for the UK significantly ratcheting up its arming and training of Saudis, at least publically, since December 2005?
UK-Saudi Arabia Deal to Modernise the Saudi Armed Forces
By UK MoD
Thu, 22 Dec 2005, 09:50
The Governments of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have today signed an Understanding Document, which is intended to establish a greater partnership in modernising the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces and developing close service-to-service contacts especially through joint training and exercises.
The partnership also recognises the key objectives shared by the two Governments with regard to national security and actions to combat global terrorism, and respects the wise leadership role exercised by the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in promoting regional stability.
In addition, the United Kingdom Government recognises the need to support the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s efforts further to develop a regional defence industrial centre of excellence. In this regard, BAE Systems will invest in local Saudi companies, develop an industrial technology transfer plan, and provide suitable training for thousands of Saudi nationals providing through life support for key in service equipments.
By any stretch of the imagination, would the troop training involve any particular manuals, for instance, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping by Brigadier General Frank Kitson?
The Guardian* reports that Shi’is** are no longer welcome in Sunni mosques which have become “training grounds and weapons stores as much as places of prayer.”
Sunnis have no large armed formations of their own. The neighbourhood vigilantes operate as small separate groups. “There are other volunteers who take turns, up to 50 of us here,” said Adnan.
As yet the Sunni militias are primarily defensive. They are not formally linked to the anti-occupation insurgency. Indeed, at the al-Nour mosque, Adnan stressed, the guards are not anti-American. “The plan is that if US forces come on their own, the guards should not fire on them. If it’s only Iraqis, they should,” he said.
The same rules apply in the nearby district of al-Furat, which unlike al-Jihad is almost entirely Sunni. “The elders have told the Americans they will not attack them if they come in. Only Iraqi forces will be hit. Since Samarra no Iraqi forces have gone into al-Furat. They know they will be massacred,” a resident said.
Who is supplying the weapons? The gun fairy? Ironic, isn’t it, that so many people have to die to reinstall the same thuggish Sunni dictatorship that suppressed the Shi’is** under Saddam, in order for the U.S. to get a tight grip on the oil flow. What other explanation is there? The only difference between Allawi and Saddam is the former attempted to retain sovereignty for Iraq and for the time being, Allawi is willing to sell Iraqis out to the United States. I suspect he is busily selecting gold laden tiles for the swimming pool on the compound of his future fortress. Then again, maybe there’s a place for him in this one.