“Americans have also trained Interior Ministry police and commandoes, though—unlike some notorious cases in recent Latin American history—there is little evidence to suggest that U.S. trainers have actively encouraged death squad activity. “
– Stephen Zunes
The Way of the Commandos
By PETER MAASS
1 May 2005 Time Magazine
The commandos and their leaders insist that they are loyal to the government rather than to any political or religious group. ”There is no Sunni or Shia,” Adnan told me, meaning that he does not pay attention to the religious origins of his men or the insurgents they hunt. ”Anyone who tries to stop Iraq from moving forward, I will fight them.” Adnan’s statement is predictable, but is it convincing? The commando chain of command is largely Sunni — they were set up by a Sunni minister (Naqib) and are led by a Sunni general (Adnan). At this point, the commandos consist mainly of two brigades. The commander of one brigade is Rashid al-Halafi, who is Shiite but is regarded warily by other Shiites because he held senior intelligence posts under Saddam Hussein. The other brigade was founded by Gen. Muhammed Muther, a Sunni who commanded a tank regiment under Hussein.
Of course, the commandos are an effective fighting force precisely because of their Sunni background. Sunnis occupied the top positions in Hussein’s security apparatus and are, as a result, the country’s most experienced fighters. They are particularly well suited to fight in the Sunni Triangle — they have deep ties there and can extract more intelligence than outsiders, which is what Shiites and Kurds are considered in Samarra, Baqubah, Falluja, Ramadi and other insurgent strongholds. The Iraqi government improves its ability to fight the insurgents by bringing veteran Sunni military men on board.
In March 2005, former Samarra resident General Adnan Thabit led 1,500 Iraqi security forces on a mission to “flush Samarra of insurgents and weapons.” Adnan Thabit is Donald Rumsfeld’s ally.
Donald Rumsfeld, the US Defence Secretary, has said units such as General Adnan’s commandos are among “forces that are going to have the greatest leverage on suppressing and eliminating the insurgency”.
Those on the receiving end of some of this “leverage”, however, describe terrifying experiences. Ahmed Sadoun was arrested in the middle of the night at his home in Mosul by Government paramilitaries accompanied by US soldiers. He was held for seven months before being released without charge and left Iraq as soon as he could.
Speaking from Amman, the 38-year-old engineer, said: “They kicked down our door and asked about a neighbour. When I said I did not know where the man was, they started kicking me and beating me.
“When they took me to their base I was blindfolded and beaten very, very badly with metal rods. They then hung me up on hooks by my wrists until I thought they would tear off. I think that stopped because one of the Americans said something. I could hear English spoken in an angry voice. But this happened again later.”
For Iraq, “The Salvador Option” Becomes Reality
By Max Fuller
2 June 2005 Centre for Research on Globalisation
In the last few weeks, with the discovery of several mass graves in and around Baghdad, evidence of multiple extra-judicial killings has started to become much more visible, but, in fact, even a cursory review of such archives as the one compiled by Iraq Body Count reveals that mass executions have been taking place commonly in Iraq over at least the last six months. What is particularly striking is that many of those killings have taken place since the Police Commandos became operationally active and often correspond with areas where they have been deployed.
The clearest correlation is in Mosul, where the Police Commandos began operating in late October. In mid-November it was reported that insurgents were conducting an offensive and had managed to drive most of the (regular) police from the city. There followed what was described as a joint counter-offensive by US forces and Police Commandos. The Police Commandos conducted raids inside the old quarter starting on 16 November in which dozens of suspects were arrested. During one such raid on a mosque and a tea shop, detainees, blindfolded and with their hands tied behind their backs, were seen being taken away by commandos. In the weeks and months that followed over 150 bodies appeared, often in batches and frequently having obviously been executed, usually with a bullet to the head.
The victims are repeatedly stated to have belonged mostly to the security forces, with ‘insurgents’ blamed for conducting a campaign of intimidation. Yet, most of the bodies were dressed in civilian clothes with little in the way of identification. In the few instances in which positive identifications have been reported, these are based on flimsy evidence. For instance, in the case of nine victims described as soldiers that had been shot in the head, a US army lieutenant simply stated that a ‘unit recently moved to one of the US bases’ had ‘some guys missing’; photographs of the victims showed them wearing civilian clothes. A blatant case of disinformation regards a group of 31 bodies ‘discovered’ by the Police Commandos in March 2005 scattered around a cemetery in western Mosul. The bodies, described by an Interior Ministry spokesman as belonging to civilians, police officers and army soldiers, were said to have been the victims of a single policeman, Shoqayer Fareed Sheet, who confessed to these and numerous other killings on a special television show conceived by founder of the Police Commandos Adnan Thavit, called Terrorism in the Hands of Justice. Not only does this programme break every conceivable moral and legal standard, but it is notorious for parading obviously tortured detainees who are often forced to confess to being homosexuals or paedophiles as well as murderers.
Given the extreme paucity of evidence, the lack of secure identification and the disinformation put out by the Interior Ministry, there is at least a strong possibility that many, if not all, of the extra-judicial killings in Mosul have been carried out by the Police Commandos.
Yasser Salihee, an Iraqi physician who was supplementing his meagre income by working as a journalist, was murdered on June 24, 2005. He’d been investigating numerous deaths and abductions that appeared to be the work of death squads but was on his way to purchase gas for a family outing when a U.S. sniper manning a military checkpoint fired the single shot to the head that killed him. In an article published in Salon, Phillip Robertson told how he managed to gain embedded status with the sniper’s unit and eventually interviewed him. Robertson seems to believe the killing was a case of mistaken identity, but even by his account, the sniper’s version of events conflicted with those of eyewitnesses.
What is clear is that the U.S. has been funding and training paramilitary forces that are openly working with its generous benefactor against anti-occupation elements in Iraq’s government and populace. Thousands of Iraqis have been abducted and spirited away to prison facilities leaving families behind to wonder if they’ll ever be seen again. Academics have been hunted and slaughtered and their only connection has been their anti-occupation views. And General George Casey this week has said that the U.S. will continue to plant stories in the Iraqi press.
Stephen Zunes concluded:
Similarly, Sunnis were quick to express their solidarity with Shias in a series of demonstrations in Samara and elsewhere. Anti-American signs and slogans permeated these marches. Indeed, there is a widespread belief that it was the United States, not fellow Muslims or Iraqis, which bears responsibility for the tragedy. Even Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdul Mehdi claimed the United States was responsible for the bombing of the Golden Mosque, “especially since occupation forces did not comply with curfew orders imposed by the Iraqi government.” He added, “Evidence indicates that the occupation may be trying to undermine and weaken the Iraqi government.”
Though charges of a U.S. conspiracy are presumably groundless, it does underscore the growing opposition by both communities to the ongoing U.S. military presence in their country and how the United States has little credibility left with either community as a mediator, peacekeeper, overseer, or anything else.
Groundless? It may be unprovable, but the motive is blatantly obvious. The question that begs to be answered is how can Iraqis be expected to unite when a multi-billion dollar effort is underway to eradicate anti-occupation elements no matter their position in society or sectarian loyalties?