The bioweapon is in the post

09 November 2005
NewScientist.com news service

YOU might think it would be difficult for a terrorist to obtain genes from the smallpox virus, or a similarly vicious pathogen. Well, it’s not. Armed with a fake email address, a would-be bioterrorist could probably order the building blocks of a deadly biological weapon online, and receive them by post within weeks.

That’s the sobering reality uncovered by a New Scientist investigation into the bioterror risks posed by the booming business of gene synthesis. Dozens of biotech firms now offer to synthesise complete genes from the chemical components of DNA (See “A dollar a base pair” [below]). Yet some are carrying out next to no checks on what they are being asked to make, or by whom. It raises the frightening prospect of terrorists mail-ordering genes for key bioweapon agents such as smallpox, and using them to engineer new and deadly pathogens.

via GMWatch

A dollar a base pair

Biochemists have long known how to build DNA from its component “bases” – the chemical letters of the genetic code. By adding the bases in a prescribed order and carefully performing a series of chemical reactions, they can create precisely tailored stretches of DNA.

The process became significantly less laborious with the debut of the automated DNA synthesiser in the 1980s. But a full gene – a DNA sequence up to several thousand base pairs long – involves a formidable jigsaw puzzle.

Commercial gene synthesis has only really taken off in the past few years with advances in automating this assembly process. And as the main players jostle for position, the costs of gene synthesis are plummeting. Prices have dropped about tenfold in five years, and some firms now supply genes for less than $1.50 per base pair.

Reconstruction of 1918 flu virus prompts warnings

Virus synthesised in a fortnight

How the US crackdown on bioterror is backfiring

Did U.S. government lie about deadly virus?
World Science, Nov 9 2005

U.S. officials seem to have quietly reversed an assurance they gave publicly last month – that a deadly virus, which scientists recently recreated, would not leave a secure government facility.

Now, authorities acknowledge they perhaps will mail copies of the germ, which killed an estimated 50 million people in 1918, to qualified laboratories that apply for it.

The apparent flip-flop suggests the initial assurance might have been a lie, or deception, meant to calm a nervous public about the risky project, says the head of an anti-biological weapons organization.

But U.S. officials say they didn’t mislead anyone. [Cont.]

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