{"id":2036,"date":"2007-06-06T16:42:12","date_gmt":"2007-06-06T21:42:12","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/karmalised.com\/?p=2036"},"modified":"2007-06-07T13:39:44","modified_gmt":"2007-06-07T18:39:44","slug":"dennis-ross-the-sky-is-falling-lets-bomb-iran","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/karmalised.com\/?p=2036","title":{"rendered":"Dennis Ross: The sky is falling. Let’s bomb Iran!"},"content":{"rendered":"

40th anniversary of 1967 Arab-Israeli war: Lessons Learned<\/strong>
\n The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, C-Span, 4 June 2007<\/strong><\/p>\n

On 4 June 2007, C-Span covered forums [now archived<\/a>] presented by WINEP to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The PM session featured speakers who praised the brilliant peacemaking skills of Dennis Ross, promoted his new book, and framed its talking points in flourishes that distorted the historical context of the periods under review.<\/p>\n

Shock and Awe works; Israel determined to strike Iran.<\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Samuel Lewis: Former U.S. Ambassador to Israel 1977-85<\/strong>: Lewis reviewed the diplomatic styles of Eisenhower and Johnson and argued that U.S. reluctance to support publicly Israeli hegemony in the Middle East causes the Israelis to act alone. Let’s finally belly up to the bar<\/a> with our Israeli allies waving foam fingers and shouting ‘We’re #1’, is his advice.<\/p>\n

Lewis argued that Eisenhower broke the trust by prioritising U.S. relations with Nasser over the advancement of Israel’s interests. When Nasser told UN troops to leave the Sinai and the U.S. allowed it, Israelis decided they were on their own. The troop presence was the sine qua non of a commitment Eisenhower made to Ben-Gurion that withdrawal would not occur without UN talks.<\/p>\n

Lewis ticked-off the names of a few stars in what he called the “Israel-friendly galaxy” of the Johnson administration – Harry McPherson, Abe Fortas, Eugene Rostow, Arthur Goldberg and Walt Rostow. He called Johnson the friendliest president up to that point and denoted their efforts a first in the annals of U.S. government. But Johnson’s hands were tied by a Congress that refused to fulfill Israel’s “real hope” for a public statement that an attack on Israel would be an attack on the United States, and Johnson could muster only the warning, “Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone.”<\/p>\n

This bedtime story would make a nice segue to the conventional wisdom that the U.S. thought little of Israel before it flexed Arab-crushing military might in 1967. So could Gabriel Kolko’s essay, “Israel: Mythologizing a 20th Century Accident<\/a>,” which argues that “Israel’s existence was an unpredictable accident of history” and would not exist today if Hitler and the U.S. 1924 Immigration Act were not both factors then.<\/p>\n

President Harry S. Truman strong-armed UN members into creating Israel. It was an entirely deliberate act by the most public of supporters, and he did so against the advice of his administration. Truman’s choice, not the 1924 Immigration Act, determined history. It was his criticisms of the Zionist’s inhumane tactics that he kept behind closed doors<\/a>, not his support for the spanking new addition to the U.S. Empire erector set.<\/p>\n

As the opening speaker of the AM session, Richard Parker, political adviser at the U.S. embassy in Cairo in 1967, discussed the flexible intent of Johnson’s statement with Moshe Raviv, who delivered a speech later in the session. Parker objected to the ideas that the U.S. had forced the Israelis out of the Sinai in 1957 and that Dulles had made a commitment to use force to keep the Straits of Tiran open. Finally, he noted that many believe the Israelis decided to go to war when they heard that Nasser was sending Vice President Zakaria Mohieddin<\/a> to D.C. to negotiate a settlement to the crisis.<\/p>\n

The dynamic of U.S.-Israeli relations is clear. Israelis make decisions which they present to U.S. leaders. When there are obstacles to these proposals, efforts are made to break the log jam. If the way can’t be cleared, Israelis proceed with their plans despite U.S. objections. This is the bottom line that WINEP speakers did not dispute. They disagreed on why it is.<\/p>\n

There’s one other pattern worth noting. In the essay, “The Next War: Crossing the Rubicon<\/a>,” John Pilger quoted historian Barbara Tuchman’s book, The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam<\/em>. Tuchman wrote: “Johnson was affected in his conduct of Vietnam policy by three elements in his character: an ego that was insatiable and never secure; a bottomless capacity to use and impose the powers of his office without inhibition; a profound aversion, once fixed upon a course of action, to any contradictions.” Pilger saw these same characteristics in “Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and the rest of the cabal that has seized power in Washington.” Were similar observations made about Truman?<\/p>\n

The AM session closed with an interview of Hassan bin Talal, Crown Prince of Jordan 1965-99, taped on 3 June and led by the director of WINEP’s Middle East Peace Process Project, David Makovsky, who concluded by pushing the feasibility of executing the “Jordan<\/a> option<\/a>” to ethnically cleanse Palestinians by creating a federation or confederation between Jordan and the Palestinians that in effect would be a three-way arrangement controlled by Israel. Makovsky seemed to have his pom poms ready.<\/p>\n

Wendy Chamberlain: Middle East Institute President; Fmr. U.N. Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, 2004-6<\/strong>: Chamberlain reiterated that Israelis entered the Six-Day War with a public sense of vulnerability and added they annexed East Jerusalem as a bargaining chip against international pressure to return the Occupied Territories. She offered the “Three Nos” to explain why the land is still occupied 40 years later.<\/p>\n

She warned that a lasting victory cannot be found in the total humiliation of a people. In her view, a new era began with the ‘crushing blow’ Israel delivered in 1967 and Arab states never recovered esteem. She stumbled a bit over 1973. What role billions in U.S. aid, trade and other operations have played over the years she did not say but did say that non-state actors are moving in to fill the power vacuum. This seems to imply that elections which bring to power groups disliked by the U.S. are illegitimate. She urged the West to restore essential services to the Palestinians as a prerequisite to the peace process because their abominable living conditions incite religious fervour. Does she mean that if the Palestinians could die without creating the impression the West is at war with Islam then the treatment would be acceptable? She promoted the idea of a “Mommy Track” based upon the security concerns of Israeli and Palestinian mothers. As she was being reprimanded during the question period by Israeli Michael Bar-Zohar for stating that Palestinians and Israelis are equals, she never lost her smile. She delivered a brief statement later [1:15:15] on the role of the human spirit in conflict resolution.<\/p>\n

Dennis Ross: Former Middle East Envoy George H.W. Bush & Clinton Admins<\/strong>.: Last summer’s failure to destroy Hizbullah has dampened the morale of the Israeli Occupation Force and eroded its deterrent status. A Shock and Awe campaign against Iran would restore its he-man credentials. U.S. preoccupation with forming a coalition against Iran is causing Israel to feel insecure again. If Israel bombs Iran blame the U.S. for not fixing the problem soon enough.<\/p>\n

“Timing is to statecraft what location is to real estate.” Luckily for the Zionists their preferred real estate is a geopolitical lynch pin. Unfortunately for the Palestinians the reigning superpower is always hell bent on building an empire. Ross propped-up the events of Arafat’s death, Abu Mazen’s election win on a platform of non-violence, and Sharon’s so-called unilateral disengagement from Gaza as openings missed by a U.S. that was engaged elsewhere. His ability to strip context from events and assign them new meaning is diabolical.<\/p>\n

Slow-motion diplomacy is bad. Security Council resolutions are slow-motion diplomacy. The lesson of Osirak is listen to the Israelis!! The Iranians won’t let them live!! Transformational objective: prevent Iran from going nuclear.<\/p>\n

The U.S. must marry objectives and means. The Europeans have a greater fear of use of force against Iran than of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Hammer them to sanction Iran. Use Saudi Arabia’s economic clout. You want a reality-based assessment? Bomb Iran now or Israel will.<\/p>\n

What is the state of U.S.-Israel coordination today?<\/p>\n

Lewis: Close but “secrets” remain. There is a reluctance on both parts to get past a certain point of discussing military contingencies. “Keep agreement on the circumstances for taking out reactors secret so no one tells them they cannot.” At this point everyone is dancing.<\/p>\n

Ross concluded: Who controls Iraq’s airspace? The U.S. decides when the dance goes from a slow waltz into a fox trot.<\/p>\n

So why should the U.S. be in a rush to bomb Iran?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

40th anniversary of 1967 Arab-Israeli war: Lessons Learned The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, C-Span, 4 June 2007 On 4 June 2007, C-Span covered forums [now archived] presented by WINEP to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the 1967 Arab-Israeli … Continue reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2036","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/pdXTf-wQ","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/karmalised.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2036","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/karmalised.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/karmalised.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/karmalised.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/karmalised.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=2036"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"http:\/\/karmalised.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2036\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/karmalised.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=2036"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/karmalised.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=2036"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/karmalised.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=2036"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}